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Abstract 
 
This paper attempts to assesswhether participation ina microfinance program helps households 
generate personal savings, as distinct from savings through compulsory contributions to the 
program. We consider a microfinance programinitiated by the Government of India (the SGSY 
scheme),which is operated under a joint liability credit system that requires formation of Self-
Help Groups (SHG).The empirical design relies on two samples of respondents: a “treatment 
group” of households participating in the microfinance program and a “control group” of non-
participating households of similar characteristics. Using data collected at two points in time 
(April-July 2004baseline and September-December 2009 endline), we show that although 
income increases more in treatment-group households, the increase in personal savings of the 
microfinance-participating households over the study period is less than for the non-participating 
households. 
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Introduction 
 
A popular and useful definition of a poor person is someone who earns only a small income and 
spends most of the earnings on consumption of necessary commodities, which leaves very little 
money, or sometimes nothing, for savings. It is often argued that lower income households have 
very little desire to save(see, e.g.,Bhaduri, 1973). Immediate consumption needs must take 
priority for households on the brink of subsistence, and little surplus are left to save for 
tomorrow. Basu (1997), however, points to a logical flaw in Bhaduri’s argument: if the poor 
households are forward looking, they should see the virtue of savings, which over the long run 
can help them escape from the “poverty trap”. In fact, savings deposits offer important 
advantages to low income households to build up assets, which eventually can be used as 
collateral, help reduce consumption volatility over time, and allow self-financingof investments 
rather than always turning to creditors (Wright, Hossain, and Rutherford, 1997). A recent study 
based on data from developing countries has shown that low income households experiencing 
difficulties and fluctuations in their life need accumulated savings to smooth income over 
economic shocks (Collins et al., 2009). 
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Poor households try to save for many different reasons. The financial savings are 
typically used as buffer stocks to smooth consumption during and after economic shocks. 
Savingshelp low income rural households to mitigate vulnerability
2
.Savings can be used to 
facilitate large lumpy expenditures in emergency situations, including both personal emergencies 
(e.g., sickness, injury, sudden widowhood, loss of employment, etc.) and natural disasters (e.g., 
flood, fire,mudslide, etc.). Low income households use savings to pay children’s school fees, to 
fulfill the household’s essential obligations, such as a daughter’s wedding, etc., and sometimes as 
working capital for income generating activities. As low income households face borrowing 
constraints, they sometimes put extra cash directly into their own business, earning a higher 
return than from alternative saving options. A less visible way of saving is self-financing a 
business or purchasing equipment and especially livestock, which similarly to jewelry can be 
easily sold for cash in times of distress. Yet despite their wide ranging needs, the poor lack safe, 
secure, and convenient institutions in which they can save. Poor householdshave meager saving 
capacity and conventional financial institutions are not willing to “bank”the poor. Sometimes 
banks are situated far from the village and rural households have to bear hightransaction and 
transportation costs if they wish to access the bank’s savings facilities. Thus, poor households 
have to rely on various informal ways for saving. They keep money in the house (possibly in a 
lock box) or sometimes usetheir employer or a trustworthy neighbor to guard their money. They 
may deal with a non-banking financial institution that provides door step service – a messenger 
or an agent who visits the client when necessary. 
Recently microfinance practitioners have begun to acknowledge the importance of 
savings mechanism among microfinance-program participants. Hirschland (2005) has found that 
most people prefer savings to credit because borrowing is often much riskier than savings. 
Kabeer (2001) has shown that credit is not always appropriate for poor women: a loan may 
become a burden asthe poor find it difficult to repay the loan because of their low income and 
high interest rates.From the point of view of financial literacy, one can argue that savings 
generation should be an important aspect of an overall microfinance program where learning to 
save or building a savings culture is crucial to one’s economic self-reliance over a lifetime.  
Every microfinance system includesa compulsory savings program whose objective is to 
develop asaving discipline among the low income participating households. This is based on the 
concept of Rotating Savings and Credit Association (ROSCA),whose primary objective is to 
generate savings among the participants before they can borrow. Besley, Coate, and Loury 
(1993) have shown that a ROSCA participant benefits more than an individual who follows 
autarkic saving. In theROSCA framework, which in effect works through a joint liability 
microcredit contract, the basic element is a group of individuals who agree to regularly 
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contribute money to a common “pot”, and the accumulated amount is allocated as a loan to one 
group member in each period.This system helps the participants to accumulate savings in a 
regular structured way.  
Arural microfinance system with ROSCA-type group lending typically involves creation 
of Self-Help Groups (SHG)among village women (mostly married). SHG is a voluntary 
association of 10-15 members, all from the same socio-economic background. The group 
members are encouraged to save small amounts in regular installment and then borrow from the 
accumulated group savings with the consent of other group members (as in ROSCA). The SHG 
microfinance program relies on the existing bank network to deliver financial services to the 
poor. The SHG members individually may not have sufficient savings to open a personal bank 
account, but the pooled saving enable them to open a bank account in the name of the group. 
Thisgroup account, however, comes with so many conditionality that it can hardly be considered 
a savings account. For instance, only a fraction of the accumulated savings can be withdrawn by 
the members and that at least one year after the formation of the group. The accumulated savings 
are held as collateral for the micro-lenders in the group and the entire account balance can be 
withdrawn only after the liquidation of the group. 
In principle, the compulsory saving schemein a microfinance program is necessary to 
allow the participants to build up assets overtime and to develop a saving discipline. However, 
the compulsory regular contributions in the SHG cannot be regarded as personalsavings in a real 
sense. Personal savings are generated by the participating households if they manage to utilize 
the microfinance service in such a way that they enhance their income and retain part of the 
enhanced income as savings in an outside financial institution or in a personal lock box. It is thus 
expected that the participants will borrow from their SHG and use the loan as working capital or 
investment for some income generating activity, enhancingboth their income andtheir personal 
savings. In this way they will achieve some financial security for the future and reduce 
theirvulnerability.  
Very few studies have attempted to evaluate the impact of a microfinance system under a 
joint liability credit contract onpersonal savings generation among participating rural households. 
Khalily (2004), analyzinga rural household survey in Bangladesh,did not find any positive 
impact of microfinance programs on personal savings. On the other hand,DeSilva(2012) has 
shown that in Sri Lanka participation in a microfinance program had a positive impact both on 
per capita income and on personal savings generation among low income households.  
The basic objective of this article is to investigate whether participation in amicrofinance 
program enhances personal savings among the participating households above and beyond the 
compulsory regular contributions to the group. We consider the microfinance program that 
operates across India under the SGSY (SwarnaJayanti Gram SwarojgarYojana) scheme
3
.  
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Sample design and methodology 
 
To investigate the research problem formulated in the previous paragraph, we have to compare 
the enhancement of personal savings of SHG member households with that of non-participating 
households having similar socio-economic background. The enhancement of personal savings is 
calculated by collecting data at two points in time (baseline and endline). The comparison 
between participating and non-participating households can be done using the treatment effect 
model, in which the SHG member households under the SGSY scheme areconsidered as the 
“treatment group” and the non-member households are considered as the “control group”.The 
control-group sample is selected so that it has almost the same distribution of observed 
characteristics as the treatment-group sample.  
The present study is based on a survey of households in the South 24 Parganas district of 
West Bengal, India, one of the country’s 250 economically most backward districts in 2006 
(Ministry of Panchayati Raj, 2009).In a multistage sampling design,five villages (“gram 
panchayats”) were chosen at random in two community development blocks4 (also chosen at 
random out of the 29 blocksin the district).The agro-climatic and farming conditionswere almost 
identical inthe sample villages, wherepredominance of mono-cropping was observed. The 
sample villages were not particularly prosperous, and the residents in the survey area had limited 
opportunities for non-farm employment. A large segment of the households in the sample 
villages had joined the microfinance program under the SGSY scheme. We identified 33 Self-
Help Groups (SHG) in the five sample villages,
5
which were formed under the SGSY scheme 
between April-July 2007 (the baseline period t0 in our study), each consisting of 14-15 members. 
From each SHG we randomly chose 7 members (8 members from one group). The treatment 
group thus had total sample size of 232 respondents, all of which agreed to answer to our 
structured questionnaire and all of which happened to be married women.  
For the control group, we first identified households in the sample villages who had not 
joined any SHG during the entire study period, i.e., kept their non-member status until 
September-December 2009 (the endline t1)
6
.From these non-member households we chose 
married women(like the respondents in the treatment group) with farming as the major source of 
earnings, sometimes supplemented with non-farm activity. We took special care to ensure that 
the control group closely matched the treatment group by economic, physical, and social 
attributes. The control group had total sample size of 156. 
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in group formation. SGSY is perhaps the largest microcredit based scheme of its kind in the world. For 
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Impact evaluation requires data at two points in time. Socio-economic information was 
collected from households that joined an SHG under the SGSY scheme and households that did 
not join any microfinance program – in the baseline period (April-July 2007) and then 
againintheendline period (September-December 2009).Our objective was to estimate personal 
savings enhancement in the treatment and control groups: this was done by differencing the 
personal savings data between baseline and endline. The regression model estimated the change 
in personal savings as a function of the change in income and the change in Women’s 
Empowerment Index (constructedby the author) between the two periods:
7
 
 
(1)                      
 
In equation (1),the outcome variable ∆Savingsi is the change of personal savings 
(measured in rupees) of respondent betweenthe baseline t0 and the endlinet1: this is the measure 
of savings enhancement. Similarly∆Mincomeiis the change of monthly income (income 
enhancement) and ∆EMPIDXi isthe change of the value of Women’s Empowerment Index(see 
Appendix for details) of respondent between the two time periods. SGSY is a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 if the respondent belongs to the treatment group (a participant in the 
microfinance program) and the value 0 if the respondent is in the control group (not a 
participant). is the error term. 
Here the outcome variableΔSavingsi may be positive, negative, or zero. Each respondent 
is a married woman who is part of a household and spends most of her earnings (if any) for the 
welfare of her family.Thereforethe respondent’s “individual”personal savings are impossible to 
determine and instead wetakethe savings of the entire household during the relevant period as 
“personal” savings. The baselinepersonal savings is the amount that a household (in either 
treatment or control group) could save on average after paying all the necessary expenses, 
including loan repayment to formal or informal lenders (if required). In calculating the 
endlinesavings for the households in the treatment group,we excluded the compulsory monthly 
contributions to SHG (about Rs.30-Rs.40, less than $1 per month) and the amountsusedfor 
repaying microcredit loans with interest in monthly installments
8
 during the endlineaveraging 
time.For households in the control group, the endline procedure was the same as at baseline. 
Our field work shows that a substantial number of sample householdsin boththe treatment 
and the control group save in a nearby postalbank or local private bank, but mostly in a private 
lock box at home, which is managed by the head woman of the household. Uncertifiedlocal 
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private banks play a major role in the development of saving habits of the rural households in the 
sample villages. They provide “door step” service by sending their representatives to collect 
savings from the client’s home. The agent or the representative gives the client a formal receipt 
after collecting the money. The collection can be done each month or every fortnight. The rate of 
interest on these savings deposits is 5% to 6%,which is higher than the3% interest offered on 
savings depositsby public sector commercial banks(e.g., the Allahabad Bank in that locality). 
The availability of door step service minimizes the transaction cost of savings for the rural 
households. The rural households generally do not withdraw their savings unless they face an 
emergency.The financial savings are typicallyused as buffer stocks to smooth consumption 
during and after economic shocks.   
Enhanced household savings depend on the existence of enhanced income (as reflected in 
model (1)). For microfinance participants the picture may be different because the major 
objective of joining a microfinance program is to get access to microcredit that can be utilized as 
working capital in some income generating activity. The enhanced income may thus be used to 
repay the loan with interest, leaving almost nothing for savings. ∆Mincomei is included as an 
explanatory variable in Eq. (1) because Kundu (2012)has shown that the treatment-group 
households were able to enhance their monthly income andtheir monthly per capita consumption 
expenditure more than the control-group households between baseline and endline. Our objective 
now is to investigate whether enhanced monthly income helps the SGSY member households to 
enhance their savings more than the control-group households. 
Anderson and Baland (2002) have shown through their village level survey in Kenya that 
an important motive for a woman to join ROSCA is to keep money away from her husband – the 
family’s principal decision maker in rural India – and save for the family’s future. Enhancement 
of women’s decision-making power as reflected in the Women Empowerment Indexis therefore 
expected to play a role in retaining part of household income for savingsand – the 
change in the value of the index between baseline and endline– is accordingly introduced as 
another explanatory variable for savings enhancement in Eq. (1). 
Table 1 presents the means of the explained and explanatory variables in Eq. (1) for the 
treatment and control groups at two points in time: the baseline (t0) and the endline (t1). The 
monthly income and savings are presented in real terms (i.e., adjusted for inflation relative to t0 
as the base period).   
 
Table 1: Means of the explained and explanatory variables for treatment and control group in two 
periods 
Variable Treatment group households Control group households 
t0 t1 t0 t1 
Savings (Rs.) 186.24 201.36 232.86 274.84 
MIncome (Rs.) 1717.6 2338.99 1935.27 2187.05 
EMPIDX* 5.74 10.26 6.01 8.04 
*The maximum value of the Women Empowerment Index is 20 (see Appendix). 
Source: Calculated by the author from primary survey data. 
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The differences in the baseline values of MIncome and EMPIDX between the treatment 
and control groups were not statistically significant. All three variables in Table 1 are observed 
to have increased between baseline and endline. Income enhancement between baseline and 
endline for households in the treatment group was statistically significantly greater than for 
households in the control group.The change in EMPIDX between baseline and endline was also 
statistically significantly greater for treatment group households than for control group 
households. To test for differences in savings enhancement for the two groups of households (a 
dependent variable) we now shift to a multiple regression paradigm.  
 
Testing for sample selection bias 
Unlike Banerjee et al. (2010), who fully controlled the microfinance program and could 
carry out impact evaluation on the basis of a fully randomized scheme, we had no control over 
the microfinance program because SGSY is a Central Government’s policy operated through 
local authorities. We could only choose the “baseline” and the “endline” for policy impact 
assessment between two time points, but could not rely on a randomized evaluation process.
9
 
Our sampling was done on the basis of an observed characteristic (e.g., membership in the SGSY 
microcredit program at the baseline April-July 2007) and non-members were not included. The 
sample was non-random and there was danger of selection bias due to censoring or truncation of 
the non-member observations.  
To deal with the possibility of sample selection bias, we apply the two-step treatment 
effect methoddeveloped by Heckman (1976). This methodestimates two regressions 
simultaneously(see, e.g., Guo and Fraser, 2010). The first regression is the selection equation – a 
probit regression predicting the probability of being a SGSY member (i.e., being included in the 
treatment group) from strictly exogenous variables. The second equation (Eq. (3)) uses the 
original dependent variables from Eq. (1) plus an additional explanatory variable– the inverse 
Mill’s ratio or the hazard rate – which is derived from the estimated coefficients of the 
probitregression (Eq.(2)). The two-step treatment effect method is intended to correct for sample 
selection bias and it is the proper method to use if its results are significantly different from the 
OLS estimates of Eq. (1), i.e., if the estimated coefficient of the inverse Mill’s ratio in Eq. (3) is 
significantly different from zero. 
It is expected that the participation of rural women in the SGSY microfinance program 
may be influenced by the following baseline variables: the woman’sbaseline age ( ), 
whether or not the womanearns income in the baseline period ( ), the value of 
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assets the respondent household owns in the baseline period ( ), and the education 
levelof the prospective member in the baseline period ( , measured by number of 
years in schooling). The baseline market value of household assets(in rupees)is the sum total of 
the market value of the land owned by the household (if any), the house (if owned bythe 
household), the livestock (a typical store of value in rural households), the bicycle (a highly 
liquid asset which can be easily sold in distress), and the approximate value of jewelry owned by 
household members (also highly liquid). 
The selection equation thus has the form 
 
SGSY  
 
The treatment effect equation is Eq. (1) with an additional explanatory variable – the 
inverse Mill’s ratio constructed from the estimated coefficients of the selection equation (2):  
 
 
 
The inverse Mill’s ratio corrects for the correlation between the error terms in equations 
(2) and (3) and thus produces unbiased estimates (Heckman, 1976). If the estimated coefficient 
of the inverse Mill’s ratio  in regression (3) is not significantly different from zero, there is no 
correlation between the error terms in equations (2) and (3) and the OLS estimates from the 
original one-step treatment effect model (Eq. (1)).The estimation resultsfor the selection 
equation(2) are presented in Table2. The results for the treatment effect model – both the two-
step procedure (Eqs. (2)-(3)) and the OLS procedure(Eq. (1)) are presented in Table 3.  
 
Table 2: Estimation of SGSY from selection equation (2) 
Variable Sample means  Parameter estimates (Standard Error) 
(years) 39 -0.037*(0.007) 
 (years of schooling) 4.2 -0.027(0.019) 
(= 1 if respondent earns 
income in the baseline period, 0 
otherwise)  
0.157 -0.2934(0.185) 
(in rupees)          69,372 -0.0000134*(0.000006) 
Constant  1.76*(0.32) 
* Significant at 1% level.  
 
Table 3: Estimation of ΔSavings from two-stepprocedure (2)-(3) and from OLS regression (1) 
Variable Parameter estimates (Standard Error) 
Two step procedure (Eqs. (2)-(3)) OLS estimates from Eq. (1) 
SGSY -44.652 (28.72) -23.37*(9.91) 
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ΔMincome 0.019*(0.0037) 0.019*(0.0037) 
ΔEMPIDX 1.12 (1.38) 1.27(1.37) 
Constant  56.32* (16.68) 44.56* (7.49) 
Inverse Mill’s ratio  14.83  (18.77)  
  0.26 
* Significant at 1% level.  
 
We observefrom Table2that households with more assets (higher )are less likely 
to join the SGSY microfinance scheme.The age of the head woman in the household also has a 
negative effect on the probability of joining a microfinance group. Education level of the 
prospective member or whether the prospective member is an earning member at the time of 
group formation does not influence the decision to join the microfinance program. 
The estimated coefficient of the additional explanatory variable  in regression (3) is not 
statistically significantly different from zero, which establishes absence of sample selection bias 
(see, e.g., Guo and Fraser, 2010).As there is no evidence of sample selection bias from 
regressions (2)-(3), the simple OLS methods based on Eq. (1) produces valid unbiased 
estimates(see the results in the last column of Table 3). 
 
Discussion 
The results of the OLS regression based on Eq. (1) show that income enhancement has a 
positive effect on personal savings enhancement (the regression coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant). Increase of the Women Empowerment Index also tends to increase 
personal savings (the estimated coefficient is positive), but the effect is statistically not 
significant. Finally, the coefficient of SGSY is statistically significant and negative, which shows 
that personal savings enhancement is lower for microfinance participants (SGSY=1) than for 
non-participants (SGSY=0). 
Most of SGSY member households borrowed from their microcredit group during the 
study period either for income generating activities or for consumptionactivities (Table 4). The 
loan amount varied from Rs.500 to Rs.2000. Many microcredit borrowers were still repaying 
their loans even at the endline of our study. Thus, a major share of the enhanced income of the 
treatment-group households is spent on loan repayment,on consumption, and on regular 
contributions to their respective group. As a result, the microfinance member households have 
very little income left for savings. For the control-group households, which are not members of 
any microcredit scheme,Table 4shows that very few borrowed (e.g.,frommoney lenders or 
commercial banks) within the study period.Nor do they have to contribute a fixed amount 
regularly to a SHG. Hence, at the end of the month, they have on average some income left after 
all necessary expenses, and this residual income can go into savings. 
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Table 4: Number of households in the treatment and control groups who borrowed
a
 for different 
purposes during the study period (between baseline and endline) 
Uses of credit SGSY members 
(treatment) 
Non-members 
(control) 
Credit taken for income generating activities   
Agriculture 75 0 
Business 44 0 
Fishery 7 0 
Agriculture and business 15 0 
Buying a van 5 0 
Animal husbandry 2 0 
Bidi(Indian cigarette) business 1 0 
Buying a shop 1 0 
Buying a tractor 1 0 
Subtotal 151 0 
Credit taken for consumption purposes   
Building a house  18 0 
Advance for house repairs 4 4 
Medical treatment 25 10 
Bribe 0 0 
Son’s education  18 0 
Household purposes 0 2 
Subtotal 65 16 
Credit for both income-generating and consumption purposes   
Business and building a house  2 0 
Agriculture and medical treatment 4 0 
Agriculture and son’s education  1 0 
Subtotal 7 0 
a
All SGSY member households borrowed only from their respective SHGs; the non-member households 
had no to borrow from commercial banks and money lenders. 
Source: Information from the survey.  
 
Conclusions 
Ourstudy shows that participants of the SGSY microfinance program manage to increase the 
average monthly income between baseline and endlineto a greater extent than non-member 
households do.But when we look at savings enhancement between baseline and endline, we 
observe that microfinance participating households achieve smaller saving enhancement than 
non-participating households.It seems that a major part of the enhanced income of microfinance 
participating households is spent on loan repayment and various consumptionneeds, leaving very 
little for household savings. 
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Appendix: Calculation of Women’s Empowerment Index 
Questions posed to the respondents (all women) Points 
1. Decision about utilization of microcredit Female:2, Both:1, Male:0 
2. Decision on purchase of daily food items Female:2, Both:1, Male:0 
3. Decision on purchase of livestock Female:2, Both:1, Male:0 
4. Decision on purchase of utensils and other household items Female:2, Both:1, Male:0 
5. Decision on child education, child vaccination, and other 
health related matters 
Female:2, Both:1, Male:0 
6. Does the woman earn regularly and contribute to her family? Yes: 2, No:0 
7. Can the woman participate in different village assemblies 
(gram sabhas) according to her will? 
Yes: 1, No:0 
8. Can the woman spend on consumable goods (cosmetics) 
according to her will? 
Yes: 1, No:0 
9. Can the woman go outside without asking permission from her 
husband or elder son? 
Yes: 1, No:0 
10. Can the woman cast her vote according to her will? Yes: 2, No:0 
11. Can the woman protect herself against domestic violence? Yes: 1, No:0 
12. Decision on family planning  Female:2, Both:1, Male:0 
Note: The index is constructed by the author from the answers provided by the respondents. Maximum 
index value 20 points; more points indicates more women’s empowerment or more intra-household 
decision-making power of the respondent within her household.  
 
 
